Converging Systems: How Changes in Fact and Law Require a Reassessment of Suppression in Immigration Proceedings by Young, Elizabeth L.
  
1395 
CONVERGING SYSTEMS: HOW CHANGES IN FACT AND LAW 
REQUIRE A REASSESSMENT OF SUPPRESSION IN IMMIGRATION 
PROCEEDINGS 
Elizabeth L. Young ∗ 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1395 
I. LOPEZ-MENDOZA – APPLYING THE JANIS TEST IN IMMIGRATION 
COURT .................................................................................. 1400 
A.  Background on Immigration Proceedings ......................... 1402 
B.  Application of the Exclusionary Rule in Civil Proceedings:  
The Janis Test ............................................................ 1406 
II.  REASSESSING SOCIAL COST AND DETERRENCE BENEFITS ...... 1412 
A.  Nature of Immigration Proceedings ................................. 1412 
1.  From Exclusion and Deportation to Removal .............. 1413 
2.  Complexity ............................................................ 1415 
B.  Internal Control ........................................................... 1418 
C.  Individual Deterrent Effect............................................. 1422 
III.  THE CONVERGENCE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE .............. 1425 
A.  The State of the Exclusionary Rule in Immigration Court ... 1426 
B.  The Exclusionary Rule in Criminal Proceedings ................ 1431 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 1433 
INTRODUCTION 
Thirty years ago in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Lopez-
Mendoza, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s ex-
clusionary rule is inapplicable in immigration proceedings because of 
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the civil nature of those proceedings.1  But a problem exists with that 
holding:  unconstitutionally seized evidence may still form the basis 
for deportation, though that same evidence would be excluded in a 
criminal proceeding.  Consider the case of Jeanini Almeida-Amaral, a 
Brazilian national whom police stopped and immediately arrested af-
ter he walked into a gas station parking lot and presented a Brazilian 
passport after police asked for identification.2  Consider also Jorge 
Angel Puc-Ruiz, a Mexican national who was arrested after producing 
a valid state driver’s license when police entered a restaurant and 
proceeded to request identification from patrons.3  In both of these 
examples, any evidence gathered would be excluded in the criminal 
context.4  And, although the Court has repeatedly found that Fourth 
Amendment principles must at least minimally apply in the enforce-
ment of immigration statutes and regulations,5 the majority holding 
in Lopez-Mendoza results in the introduction of unconstitutionally 
seized evidence in immigration proceedings. 
In rejecting application of the exclusionary rule in immigration 
proceedings, the Court utilized the balancing test laid out in United 
States v. Janis, which requires weighing the social costs of applying the 
rule against the rule’s likely deterrent effect.6  When addressing im-
migration cases, the Supreme Court often walks a fine line between 
recognizing the specialized needs of immigration officers to stem the 
growing tide of immigration-related offenses and protecting constitu-
tional rights of both aliens and citizens.7  In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court 
 
 1 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984).  It should be noted here that there 
are strong arguments that the underpinnings of the Court’s decision were incorrect, and 
thus the entire decision should be revisited.  Elizabeth A. Rossi, Revisiting INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza:  Why the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Should Apply in Deportation Proceed-
ings, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 477 (2013). 
 2 Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 232 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 3 Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 2010).  Days after the arrest, Puc-Ruiz re-
ceived a ticket from the police claiming he violated a liquor license.  However, the charge 
was dropped and the arrest was expunged for being based on false information and for a 
lack of probable cause.  Id. at 776. 
 4 In Almeida-Amaral, the court specifically held that the facts surrounding the stop did not 
provide articulable suspicion for a stop and was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
461 F.3d at 236.  The court in Puc-Ruiz was less definitive and did not make a specific de-
cision on a basic Fourth Amendment violation.  However the underlying criminal action 
was dropped and record expunged by the municipal court based on a failure to provide 
evidence of probable cause for the arrest.  629 F.3d at 776. 
 5 See infra Part II.B. 
 6 428 U.S. 433, 448–50 (1976). 
 7 See infra Part II.B for a discussion of several cases in which the Supreme Court noted the 
ever-growing problem of unlawful immigration and the need to allow for questioning of 
aliens outside of the typical Fourth Amendment constructs. 
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held that these social costs outweighed any deterrent value.8  In gen-
eral, the Court relied heavily on three factors:  (1) a lack of the rule’s 
deterrent value in the context of what should be a simplistic immigra-
tion proceeding; (2) the intrasovereign nature of the immigration 
enforcement system; and (3) the vast numbers of arrests made by en-
forcement agents in a given year.9 
Despite the decision’s rigid approach, the blanket prohibition of 
the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings has not produced a 
clear-cut rule for lower courts.10  Instead, Part V of the opinion 
(joined by four of the five majority opinion Justices), which created a 
potential exception for violations that are “egregious” or in instances 
of widespread violations,11 has produced unequal application results 
throughout the circuits.12  Indeed, some circuits have held that the 
rule may be inapplicable, while another found that the “egregious-
ness” standard is met simply by a Fourth Amendment violation ac-
companied by “conduct a reasonable officer should have known 
would violate the Constitution.”13 
But consider how much has changed about the Lopez-Mendoza fac-
tors since 1984.  First, with regard to immigration law’s complexity, 
Congress has approved of at least two major pieces of legislation, 
along with hundreds of seemingly minor changes, since the Court’s 
decision in 1984.14  Initially, the structure of judicial proceedings was 
changed when Congress folded the traditional “exclusion” and “de-
portation” proceedings into a unified system labeled “removal pro-
ceedings,” which resulted in a uniform application of procedural re-
 
 8 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050. 
 9 Id. at 1043–50. 
 10 The majority opinion consisted of parts I–IV, and was issued by Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, and joined by four other Justices (Chief Justice Warren Burger, and Justices 
Harry Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, and William Rehnquist).  Id. at 1033.  Justice O’Connor 
also delivered an opinion in Part V, for which three other Justices joined (Justices 
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist).  Id. 
 11 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050–51. 
 12 See Motions to Suppress in Removal Proceedings:  A General Overview, AM. IMMIGR. 
COUNCIL,  1, 6–12, http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/motions_to_
suppress_in_removal_proceedings-_a_general_overview_1-26-15_fin.pdf (last updated 
Jan. 26, 2015) (reviewing the varying stances of the circuit courts regarding exceptions to 
the prohibition). 
 13 Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008).  For a full discussion of 
how the various circuits have addressed the exception, see infra notes 201–17 and accom-
panying text. 
 14 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. 
104–208, 110 Stat. 3009–546.  IIRIRA was passed simultaneously with the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214.  Jointly, these 
two statutes changed everything from criminal sanctions, grounds for deportation, and 
the judicial system. 
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quirements.15  In addition, the substantive aspects of removal pro-
ceedings have been altered:  For example, the legal analysis sur-
rounding both the grounds for removal as well as the forms of relief 
requested has grown increasingly complex.16 
Enforcement of immigration violations has also changed dramati-
cally since the inception of what is now termed the “287(g) program,” 
which allows for enforcement of federal immigration laws by local 
and state law enforcement agencies.17  By delegating enforcement re-
sponsibility to state and local agencies, the federal enforcement arm 
of immigration has lost traditional control over training and disci-
pline.18  That modern problem contradicts the Lopez-Mendoza Court’s 
focus on unified enforcement as a basis to exclude the exclusionary 
rule from immigration proceedings.19 
These two changes together—the nature of immigration proceed-
ings and increased enforcement possibilities—have also increased the 
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in more subtle ways.  In Lopez-
Mendoza, the Court focused on the ratio of arrests to agents as the sys-
tem existed in 1984, concluding that, at best, only twelve out of 500 
 
 15 The new proceedings are described in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 
1965 § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012).  One issue highlighted by the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals was the substantive and procedural rights disparity between the traditional 
exclusion/deportation proceedings, which resulted in an “entry doctrine” that amounted 
to increased rights for individuals that entered without inspection versus those that en-
tered “lawfully.” In re Romalez-Alcaide, 23 I&N Dec. 423, 442 (BIA 2002). 
 16 For an example of how forms of relief have been complicated, the REAL ID Act offers a 
prime example in the increased burden of proof, and credibility determination scheme 
laid out in INA § 208(b)(3) of the asylum statutes.  REAL ID ACT of 2005, Pub. L. 109–
13, 119 Stat. 203; see also Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803 
(2013). 
 17 Section 287(g) was added to INA through IIRIRA in 1996.  Section 287(g) explicitly al-
lows the federal government to “enter into a written agreement with a State, or any politi-
cal subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State or subdi-
vision, who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function 
of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of 
aliens in the United States . . . may carry out such function at the expense of the State or 
political subdivision and to the extent consistent with State and local law.”  INA § 
287(g)(1).  Despite the existence of this statute for several years, the first agreement was 
not created until 2002.  Randy Capps et al., Delegation and Divergence: A Study of 287(g) State 
and Local Immigration Enforcement, MIGRATION POLICY INST. 9 (Jan. 2011). 
 18 Several reports have criticized oversight protocols of the program, including an internal 
report of the Department of Homeland Security. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE 
OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OIG-10-63, THE PERFORMANCE OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS (Mar. 
2010), available at http:// www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_10-63_Mar10.pdf. 
 19 The Court focused on the INS’s “comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth Amend-
ment violations” including training, investigation, and punishment as “perhaps [the] 
most important” factor in diluting the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule in immi-
gration proceedings.  INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044–45 (1984). 
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arrests per year would even end up in immigration proceedings (the 
rest would be deported without a hearing).20  Of those, said the 
Court, few would ever raise a Fourth Amendment claim.21  But the ra-
tio of agents to arrests has significantly decreased because of unified 
immigration proceedings, more individuals exercising their right to a 
removal hearing, and the addition of 287(g) programs.22 
The exclusionary rule has developed similarly in both the criminal 
and immigration contexts.  At the time of Lopez-Mendoza, the Court 
was also balancing the costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary 
rule in the criminal context in United States v. Leon.23  In Leon, the 
Court held that the exclusionary rule should not apply if a Fourth 
Amendment violation occurs when an officer acted in reasonable re-
liance on a mistake by a neutral magistrate.24  Leon was the first of 
many cases that began to chip away at the application of the exclu-
sionary rule.25  In Herring v. United States, a majority of the Court 
summarized the exclusionary rule application as “serv[ing] to deter 
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circum-
stances recurring or systemic negligence.”26  Finally, in Davis v. United 
States, the Court further weakened the exclusionary rule by requiring 
 
 20 Id. at 1044. 
 21 Id. 
 22 See infra Part III.2.C for a discussion of the impact of the increase in numbers of Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement agents, 287(g) agents, and the numbers of arrests. 
 23 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984). 
 24 Id. at 922.  In the companion case of Massachusetts v. Sheppard, the Court held that a simi-
lar good faith exception applied when an officer reasonably relied on a warrant issued by 
a neutral magistrate although the warrant was later found to be defective.  468 U.S. 981, 
988 (1984). 
 25 Shortly after these cases, the Court held that warrantless searches based on legislation 
later found to be unconstitutional would not have sufficient deterrence of misconduct to 
justify use of the exclusionary rule.  Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 353 (1987).  Again in 
1995, the Court used the reasoning from Leon to hold that an error by a court clerk that 
led to an arrest based on a faulty outstanding warrant (resulting in what amounted to a 
warrantless arrest) would similarly not have a sufficient deterrent effect.  Arizona v. Evans, 
514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995).  In a more recent case, the Court used the social cost/deterrent ef-
fect balancing test in a more expansive situation; rather than citing to a lack of deter-
rence because of an error, the Court held that a constitutional violation in the manner of 
executing a warrant (failure to the knock-and-announce requirement) would lack suffi-
cient deterrence to justify the suppression of evidence.  Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 
586, 595 (2006).  In general, there are various ways in which the Fourth Amendment has 
lost force, including exceptions to situations in which a violation would occur, as well as 
exceptions to when the exclusionary rule should apply.  This Article will focus mainly on 
the latter.  Although the precise reason for the erosion of the exclusionary rule is up for 
debate, there is no question that the number of exceptions developed in recent decades 
has removed much of the exclusionary rule’s bite.  Christopher Slobogin, The Exclusionary 
Rule:  Is It On Its Way Out?  Should It Be?, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341 (2013). 
 26 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009). 
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courts to look at whether the Fourth Amendment violation occurred 
because law enforcement acted “deliberately, recklessly, or with gross 
negligence.”27  In his dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer summarily sug-
gested that the case law trend is moving toward a Fourth Amendment 
that protects only against “those searches and seizures that are egre-
giously unreasonable.”28 
In light of the significant changes surrounding the exclusionary 
rule in both the criminal and immigration contexts, this Article 
makes two arguments.  First, the factors related to legal complexity, 
enforcement, and ratio of agents to arrestees have changed to such a 
degree that the Court should re-examine whether to apply the exclu-
sionary rule in immigration proceedings.  Second, because the devel-
opment of exclusionary rule case law in the criminal and immigration 
context has, in application, been converging towards a similar theme 
of requiring a level of egregiousness, the Court should apply the ex-
clusionary rule in immigration proceedings precisely as it is already 
applied in criminal courts. 
Part I discusses the analysis used in the Lopez-Mendoza decision.  
Part II considers the current state of the law, and argues that the 
three Lopez-Mendoza factors have significantly changed in the inter-
vening years since the Supreme Court’s original decision.  Finally, 
Part III contends that the evolution of the exclusionary rule in both 
the immigration and criminal contexts is so similar that, assuming 
application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate in immigration 
proceedings, its application should follow the road already paved by 
its criminal counterpart. 
I. LOPEZ-MENDOZA – APPLYING THE JANIS TEST IN IMMIGRATION COURT 
In 1984, the Supreme Court took up the question of whether an 
individual in civil immigration removal proceedings should be af-
forded the right to suppress information obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.29  The case, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, involved two 
Mexican citizens who were issued orders of deportation by immigra-
tion judges in two separate hearings.30  The individuals were arrested 
 
 27 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011). 
 28 Id. at 2440 (emphasis omitted) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 29 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984). 
 30 Id. at 1034–36.  Both cases arose out of the Ninth Circuit.  Id.  The first case, Lopez-
Mendoza, originated in a California immigration court; the second, Sandoval-Sanchez, orig-
inated in a Washington immigration court.  Id.  Both individuals challenged the introduc-
tion of evidence under the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  The immigration courts in both cas-
es denied the challenges and ultimately ordered both individuals deported.  Id.  The 
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under different circumstances, but both subsequently admitted illegal 
entry into the United States.31  Both men objected to the legality of 
their arrests in immigration court.32  Immigration judges in both 
hearings found that the legality of the arrests irrelevant and therefore 
ordered both men deported.33  Both men appealed the deportation 
order to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which sustained the or-
ders and reasoning of the lower court.34  Both men again appealed, 
this time to the Ninth Circuit.35  The Ninth Circuit reversed by hold-
 
factual situations surrounding their arrests varied, though both were arrested during 
workplace raids.  Id. at 1035–36.  In Lopez-Mendoza’s case, the INS, operating on a tip, 
did not have an arrest warrant and were denied entry to the building by the owner of the 
business during work hours.  Id. at 1035.  Despite this refusal, the INS proceeded onto the 
property and began to question Lopez-Mendoza.  Id.  He admitted his name, Mexican cit-
izenship, and lack of family ties in the United States.  Id.  Based on this information, the 
INS arrested Lopez-Mendoza and took him to INS offices for further questioning.  Id.  
During this subsequent questioning, Lopez-Mendoza admitted that he had entered the 
United States without authorization.  Id.  The INS officers prepared an I–213 Record of 
Deportable Alien form, and dictated an affidavit that Lopez-Mendoza subsequently 
signed.  Id.  During immigration court, he objected to the legality of the arrest, but the 
immigration judge ruled that such issue was irrelevant in immigration court.  Id. 
   The INS similarly arrested Sandoval-Sanchez at work during an immigration raid.  Id. at 
1036.  In this case, the INS did receive permission from the manager on duty.  Id.  Agents sta-
tioned themselves at the entrance to the plant to observe “passing employees who averted their 
heads, avoided eye contact, or tried to hide themselves in a group.”  Id. at 1036–37.  They then 
questioned the individuals and if they were unable to respond to general questions in English 
or “otherwise aroused [the agent’s] suspicions” they were questioned about their immigration 
status.  Id. at 1037.  The agents did not recall Sandoval-Sanchez’s questioning specifically but 
stated that they were “certain that no one was questioned about his status unless his actions had 
given the agents reason to believe that he was an undocumented alien.”  Id.  Sandoval-Sanchez 
maintains he was never told of his right to remain silent.  Id.  In immigration court, Sandoval-
Sanchez objected to the legality of his arrest, but the immigration judge first ruled that the ar-
rest was not illegal, and alternatively that such issue was not relevant.  Id. 
 31 Id. at 1035, 1037. 
 32 Id.  Sandoval-Sanchez also objected to his admission of illegal entry, but Lopez-Mendoza 
did not.  Id. at 1040. 
 33 Id. at 1034. 
 34 Id.  
 35 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1034.  Immigration proceedings are administrative court pro-
ceedings housed within the Executive Office of Immigration Review.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a) 
(2004).  The trial stage is set before immigration judges in courts that are located 
throughout the United States.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.9(d) (2007).  Appeals are then taken to 
the next level, the Board of Immigration Appeals, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (1997), and are 
typically based on briefs, rather than oral argument.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(7)–(8) 
(1997) (providing that oral argument before a panel of Board members is not given as of 
right, but as a matter of discretion).  The Board of Immigration Appeals is located in Ar-
lington, Virginia, and all immigration court appeals throughout the country are central-
ized there.  Id.  However, for the next level of review, the circuit courts, jurisdiction lies 
with the circuit in which the immigration proceedings originated.  Immigration and Na-
tionality Act, Pub. L. No. 82–414 INA § 242, 66 Stat. 163, 208–210 (1952) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)). 
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ing that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied in immi-
gration court.36  The Supreme Court reviewed the case using the Janis 
balancing test and ultimately held that the exclusionary rule does not 
apply to civil immigration proceedings.37 
This Part will discuss the application of the Janis test in Lopez-
Mendoza.  Section A gives a brief overview of how immigration pro-
ceedings were structured at the time of the Lopez-Mendoza decision.  
Section B reviews the Supreme Court’s decision to use the Janis test, 
and then discusses the application of the test. 
A.  Background on Immigration Proceedings 
In order to fully understand the effect of suppression in immigra-
tion proceedings, some background related to the structure of immi-
gration proceedings at the time of the Lopez-Mendoza decision is re-
quired.  Immigration proceedings are civil cases, adjudicated by im-
immigration judges within an administrative agency.38  Immigration 
proceedings are divided into two separate phases:  first, the determi-
nation of whether an individual is deportable from the United States, 
and then whether they are eligible for a form of relief from deporta-
 
 36 Id.  The immigration judge in Sandoval-Sanchez’s case made a finding on the legality of 
the arrest, so the Ninth Circuit was able to make a substantive ruling in his case, finding 
that the immigration judge erred, and that the arrest and subsequent admission should 
be suppressed.  See id. at 1037–38 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning for its decision 
with respect to Sandoval-Sanchez’s case).  Since the immigration judge had avoided the 
substantive issue of the legality of arrest in Lopez-Mendoza’s case, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed the order of deportation and remanded back to the court to undergo the analysis.  
Id. at 1035–36. 
 37 See id. at 1042 (“Applying the Janis balancing test to the benefits and costs of excluding 
concededly reliable evidence from a deportation proceeding, we therefore reach the 
same conclusion as in Janis [that the exclusionary rule should not apply to these proceed-
ings].”). Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion for Parts I–IV in which Chief Justice Burger 
and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined; and Part V for which only 
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined.  See id. at 1034 (noting the justices who joined 
with respect to each part of the opinion).  Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens 
all filed dissenting opinions.  Id. at 1051–61 (containing the various dissenting opinions). 
 38 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14 (2012).  The Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) was 
created in 1983, just before the Supreme Court decision in Lopez-Mendoza.  See 48 Fed. 
Reg. 8038, 8038–40 (Feb. 25, 1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 100) (announcing 
the creation of the EOIR).  It is important to note that the cases on review in Lopez-
Mendoza were adjudicated under the former structure of the INS that included special in-
quiry officers within the INS, rather than Administrative Law Judges within EOIR.  How-
ever, these changes were made well before the case was briefed and argued before the 
Supreme Court.  The case was argued on Wednesday, April 19, 1984.  Lopez-Mendoza, 468 
U.S. at 1032. 
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tion.39  Further, there were two types of proceedings:  the first, exclu-
sion proceedings, applied to individuals who were seeking admission 
to the United States; the second, deportation proceedings, to those 
who had either entered the United States without inspection, or to 
those who had entered lawfully but were charged with violating the 
terms of their stay in the United States.40 
In an exclusion proceeding, the burden is on the alien to demon-
strate that they are eligible to enter the country.41  In a deportation 
proceeding, the initial burden is placed on the government to show 
by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged 
as grounds for deportation are true.”42  In order to meet this burden, 
a finding of deportation must be based on “reasonable, substantial, 
and probative evidence.”43  Note that the different burdens of proof 
in these two proceedings have a profound effect on certain constitu-
tional rights.44  For instance, although an individual may rely on the 
Fifth Amendment to remain silent about potential information lead-
 
 39 See INA § 240(a)(1) (codified as 8 U.S.C. 1229a(a) (2006)) (determining deportabilitiy); 
see also INA § 240(c)(4) (codified as 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4) (2006)) (governing applica-
tions for relief from deportation). 
 40 Although those not practicing in immigration court colloquially refer to all immigration 
proceedings as “deportation,” it is important to distinguish the legal terms for proceed-
ings.  As discussed here, the actual proceedings pre-1996 were termed “exclu-
sion/deportation,” while after 1996 and the statutory revamp of IIRIRA, the proceedings 
were unified into what are called “removal proceedings.”  For a more in-depth explana-
tion of these proceedings, see THOMAS ALEINIKOFF, DAVID MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA, 
AND MARYELLEN FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:  PROCESS AND POLICY 1147–
48, 1158–1773 (7th ed. 2011). 
 41 See In re Singh, 21 I&N Dec. 427, 431 n.4 (BIA 1996) (“The burden in exclusion proceed-
ings is ordinarily upon the applicant to establish that he is admissible to the United 
States.”); see also INA, Pub. L. No. 82–414, § 291, 66 Stat. 163, 234–35 (1952) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994)).  Although courts often cite to the United States 
Code when referring to the Immigration and Nationality Act (found in Chapter 8), this 
Article cites directly to the INA because it has not been incorporated into the Code as 
positive law.  See Positive Law Codification, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL, 
http://uscode.house.gov/codification/legislation.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2015, 5:10 
PM) (indicating non-positive law titles in the Code, including Title 8). 
 42 Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966); see also 8 C.F.R. § 240.8(a) (1997) (“A respond-
ent charged with deportability shall be found to be removable if the Service proves by 
clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is deportable as charged.”).  This 
would require the government to demonstrate respondent’s alienage, and to provide 
some evidence that he or she was not lawfully present.  See INA § 240(c)(3) (2004) (artic-
ulating the kind of evidence the government must present to meet its burden). 
 43 INA, Pub. L. No. 82–414, § 242(b)(4), 66 Stat. 163, 210 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(7)(B)). 
 44 See In re Castellon, 17 I&N Dec. 616, 620 (BIA 1981) (citing In re Cenatice, et al., 16 I&N 
Dec. 162 (BIA 1977)) (“[A]pplicants for admission in exclusion proceedings do not ordi-
narily enjoy the same constitutional rights that are available to aliens who have made an 
entry into the United States.”) 
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ing to a criminal prosecution,45 an immigration judge may draw an 
adverse inference from this silence.46  Thus, mere silence in an exclu-
sion proceeding could lead to a finding against the alien because the 
burden is on the alien to present evidence of lawful presence in the 
country.47  However, in a deportation proceeding, because the bur-
den is on the government to prove unlawful presence in the country, 
a statement of silence could still lead to the government failing to 
meet the burden for deportation if no other evidence is introduced.48 
In both deportation and exclusion proceedings, once the first 
phase of the hearing is complete and the individual is found to be ei-
ther excludable or deportable, the individual is then allowed to re-
quest relief from deportation from the United States.49  Although the 
Court was not faced with the issue of forms of relief in Lopez-Mendoza, 
it is important to note that an individual in deportation proceedings 
was eligible for a number of additional forms of relief than an indi-
vidual in exclusion proceedings.50  Decisions from the immigration 
 
 45 See In re R-, 4 I&N Dec. 720, 721 (BIA 1952) (“The fifth amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States protects a witness testifying in deportation proceedings from giving evi-
dence which would tend to show his guilt under a Federal criminal statute.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 46 See In re Guevara, 20 I&N Dec. 238, 241 (BIA 1991) (“[U]nder certain circumstances, an 
adverse inference may indeed be drawn from a respondent’s silence in deportation pro-
ceedings.”). 
 47 See id. at 241–42 (citing United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904)) (discussing ex-
clusion proceedings and noting that “when confronted with evidence of, for example, the 
respondent’s alienage, the circumstances of his entry, or his deportability, a respondent 
who remains silent may leave himself open to adverse inferences, which may properly 
lead in turn to a finding of deportability against him”). 
 48 Id. at 242 (finding that the holdings of cases in the context of exclusion proceedings “by 
no means mitigate the clear requirement . . . that the burden of proof in deportation 
proceedings is upon the Service to establish the alienage of the respondent, and ultimate-
ly his deportability, by evidence that is clear, unequivocal, and convincing”).  
 49 There are various forms of relief found throughout the INA, ranging from voluntary de-
parture, which simply allows the individual to voluntarily leave the country without an or-
der of deportation and the accompanying penalties, to asylum, which eventually allows 
the individual to become a lawful permanent resident.  See INA, Pub. L. No. 82–414, § 
242(b)(1), 66 Stat. 163, 210 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1994)) (provid-
ing for voluntary departure for alien under deportation proceedings); INA § 208 (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994)) (allowing aliens physically present in the 
United States to apply for asylum); INA §§ 242(b)(1), 208 (1994).  The forms of relief 
from deportation are located throughout the INA and come in the form of waivers (such 
as section 212(c) or 212(h)) or substantive relief (such as asylum under section 208).  See 
Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States:  A Case Study on the Imple-
mentation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 433, 441 n.19 (1992) (discussing the major forms of relief available in de-
portation proceedings). 
 50 For instance, while asylum under § 208 was available in both exclusion and deportation 
proceedings, voluntary departure and suspension of deportation was only available in de-
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court are directly appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA).51 
In order to address the propriety of using the exclusionary rule in 
Lopez-Mendoza, the Court first looked to how the two individuals at-
tempted to invoke the rule during the first phase of immigration pro-
ceedings.52  In the first case, Lopez-Mendoza argued the illegality of 
the arrest led to his placement in immigration court, and objected 
only to the fact of initiation of proceedings against him.53  The Court 
quickly dispensed of his case by holding that even if the exclusionary 
rule applied in immigration court, the outcome would not have 
changed his case.54  The Court reasoned that because Lopez-Mendoza 
objected only to the initiation of proceedings, and not to the evi-
dence presented against him, use of the exclusionary rule would not 
benefit him.55 
Sandoval-Sanchez, however, objected not only to the proceedings, 
but also to the evidence presented against him—namely, the I-213 
that formed the basis for his arrest and statements made during the 
arrest.56  The Court recognized that Sandoval-Sanchez’s objection to 
the evidence offered against him was properly within the purview of 
the exclusionary rule, as both statements and evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment would be excluded if the con-
duct in question had a substantial connection to the unlawful con-
 
portation proceedings.  INA, Pub. L. No. 82–414 § 242(b)(1), 66 Stat. 163, (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1994)); INA, Pub. L. No. 82–414 § 244, 66 Stat. 163, (codi-
fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. § (1994)); INA §§ 242(b)(1), 244 (1994). 
 51 8 C.F.R. 1240.15. 
 52 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1984). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id.  Prior cases, both in criminal as well as civil forfeiture proceedings, have held that the 
identity, or “body,” of an individual is a fact that is not suppressible under the exclusion-
ary rule.  Id. at 1039–40. 
 56 See id. at 1037–38, 1040 (describing the initial proceedings in Sandoval-Sanchez’s case).  
An I–213 is a Record of Deportable Alien, which is “essentially a recorded recollection of 
a conversation with the alien” by the examining officer.  Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d 
1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1990). 
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duct.57  The question therefore became whether, and to what extent, 
the exclusionary rule applied to immigration proceedings.58 
B.  Application of the Exclusionary Rule in Civil Proceedings:  The Janis Test 
In order to assess whether the exclusionary rule should apply in 
immigration proceedings, the Court began by determining the na-
ture of the proceeding, finding it to be “a purely civil action to de-
termine eligibility to remain in the country, not to punish an unlaw-
ful entry.”59  In comparing immigration court proceedings to the 
criminal system, the Court indicated that the only issue adjudicated 
in the immigration context is whether the individual should be de-
ported, rather than a determination of guilt for potential criminal vi-
olations related to immigration (such as unlawful entry).60  Citing 
multiple cases, the Court observed that constitutional protections in 
criminal proceedings do not automatically extend to immigration 
proceedings.61  In addition, the Court observed, the burden of proof 
in immigration court is significantly different from the “beyond a rea-
sonable doubt” burden in the criminal context.62  The INS has the 
burden to demonstrate identity and alienage based on “reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence” for an alien who entered the 
 
 57 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040–41 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 
(1963)) (“The general rule in a criminal proceeding is that statements and other evi-
dence obtained as a result of an unlawful, warrantless arrest are suppressible if the link 
between the evidence and the unlawful conduct is not too attenuated.”); see also Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that “all evidence obtained by searches and sei-
zures in violation of the Constitution is . . . inadmissible in a state court”); Weeks v. Unit-
ed States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule). 
 58 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041 (“The reach of the exclusionary rule beyond the con-
text of a criminal prosecution . . . is less clear . . . . [T]he court has never squarely ad-
dressed the question before.”). 
 59 Id. at 1038.  The Supreme Court has long held that deportation is not a punishment, but 
instead “removal of an alien out of the country, simply because his presence is deemed 
inconsistent with the public welfare.”  Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709 
(1893).  For a discussion of deportation as punishment, see Sarah Paige, Deportation, Due 
Process, and Deference:  Recent Developments in Immigration Law, 22 COLUM. J. OF POL. & SOC’Y 
149, 179–82 (2011). 
 60 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038 (“The judge’s sole power [in a deportation hearing] is 
to order deportation; the judge cannot adjudicate guilt or punish the respondent for any 
crime related to unlawful entry into or presence in this country.”). 
 61 Id. at 1038–39.  See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (finding no application 
of Ex Post Facto Clause to deportation); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 
149, 157 (1923) (finding rule excluding involuntary confessions not applicable in depor-
tation hearings); Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 808 (1st Cir. 1977) (finding no re-
quirement of Miranda warnings in deportation case). 
 62 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039 (citation omitted). 
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country unlawfully.63  The burden then shifts to the alien to prove any 
eligibility for relief from deportation.64  Based on these facts, the 
Court held that the system was purely civil.65  Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that the Janis test should be utilized to determine whether 
the exclusionary rule applies to immigration proceedings.66 
The Court acknowledged that the reach of the exclusionary rule 
outside of the criminal context was “less clear” and had “never [been] 
squarely addressed.”67  The Court turned to the framework set out in 
United States v. Janis, noting that, although the test was imprecise, it 
created the necessary tools for weighing social benefits against social 
costs.68  In Janis, the Court indicated that any balancing must recog-
nize that the “prime purpose” of the exclusionary rule “is to deter fu-
ture unlawful police conduct.”69  After weighing the benefits and costs 
in that case, the Court held the exclusionary rule inapplicable be-
cause it was not necessary to deter the actors through exclusion of ev-
idence in a civil hearing.70  After all, reasoned the Court, the exclu-
sionary rule already renders unlawfully seized evidence unavailable in 
any state or federal criminal trial.71  Put differently, the Court thought 
that there would be no benefit in deterrence, but a significant cost in 
loss of evidence.  In relying on the Janis balancing in Lopez-Mendoza, 
 
 63 Id. 
 64 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (2012) (“In the proceeding the alien has the burden of 
establishing—(A) if the alien is an applicant for admission, that the alien is clearly and 
beyond doubt entitled to be admitted and is not inadmissible . . . .”). 
 65 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038. 
 66 See id. at 1042 (applying the Janis balancing test).  However, it is important to note that 
the Justices made a leap in logic by stating that simply because several criminal constitu-
tional protections do not apply in a civil context, that the proceeding was meant to be on-
ly a streamlined process of eligibility to remain in this country and “nothing more.”  See 
id. at 1039 (“In short, a deportation hearing is intended to provide a streamlined deter-
mination of eligibility to remain in this country, nothing more.”).  Although this Article 
discusses only the evolution of immigration law and increasing complexity since Lopez-
Mendoza, courts have long stated that deportation proceedings are far from a non-
complex, “streamlined” process.  See infra Part II.A.2. 
 67 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041.  The Court noted that the issue had been discussed in a 
prior case, Bilokumsky, 263 U.S. at 155, wherein the Court “assumed” evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment would be excluded from a hearing within the De-
partment of Labor.  However, that case did not expressly analyze whether the rule should 
be applied.  Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041. 
 68 Id. 
 69 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 
U. S. 338, 347 (1974)). 
 70 Id. at 454. 
 71 Id. at 446–47. 
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the Court solidified an actual test to determine to what extent the ex-
clusionary rule would apply in the civil context.72 
To apply the test in Lopez-Mendoza, the Court first assessed the de-
terrent value of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings, 
highlighting six major factors:  (1) the primary objective of the en-
forcement agents; (2) whether the enforcement agents are within the 
same agency initiating proceedings; (3) what effect the suppression 
will have on the proceedings; (4) current use of the suppression doc-
trine; (5) internal agency procedures for addressing Constitutional 
violations; and (6) alternative remedies available.73 
The Court recognized that two factors favored use of the exclu-
sionary rule in the immigration system.  First, although immigration 
proceedings are often viewed as the civil complement to a potential 
criminal trial (e.g., unlawful entry),74 the Court noted that only “a 
very small percentage” of the individuals in immigration proceedings 
are actually prosecuted criminally.75  Thus, immigration enforcement 
agents primarily seek to use evidence gained from arrests in the civil 
immigration proceedings.76  Excluding evidence in an immigration 
proceeding would result in a high level of deterrence, as it would be 
the only venue in which the evidence is presented.77  Second, the 
same agency78 that effectuates an arrest will also decide whether to in-
itiate immigration proceedings.79  Key in this factor is the 
intrasovereign nature of the violation:  The agency that seeks to bene-
fit from the evidence is the same agency that controls the agents 
gathering the evidence.80  The Court held that against this backdrop, 
suppressing evidence would serve as an effective deterrent because of 
the direct and negative consequence to both the officers and the 
agency collecting the evidence.81 
In addition to analyzing if exclusion would deter agents from 
committing Fourth Amendment violations, the Court noted a sec-
 
 72 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041. 
 73 Id. at 1042–45. 
 74 The INA provides for both civil and criminal penalties for various infractions.  For in-
stance, unlawful entry can result in a criminal charge under § 275, as well as a charge of 
inadmissibility in immigration proceedings under § 212. 
 75 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1042–43. 
 76 Id. at 1043. 
 77 Id. at 1042–43. 
 78 At the time of the Lopez-Mendoza decision, immigration enforcement, prosecution, and 
adjudication were each carried out by the Immigration and Nationality Service.  INA 
§§ 235, 239 (1996). 
 79 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043. 
 80 See id. at 1043; see also Janis, 428 U.S. at 455.  
 81 See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043. 
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ondary test in civil court exclusion cases—that is, whether social costs 
associated with exclusion are properly outweighed by individual pri-
vacy benefits.82  In the case of immigration proceedings, the Court de-
termined that the costs to society were high, thus resulting in little 
benefit.83  The main cost with applying the exclusionary rule, accord-
ing to the Court, was the prospect of a large undocumented popula-
tion and the need to address this problem.84  Particularly problematic 
for the Court was the nature of immigration laws governing undocu-
mented presence.85  Given that unlawful presence in the country is a 
continuing violation, the Court compared release from immigration 
court to forcing law enforcement agents to return unlawful explo-
sives, drugs, or firearms to individuals if seized in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. 86  In a reference to Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s 
oft-cited quotation from People v. Defore, the Court stated that “[t]he 
constable’s blunder may allow the criminal to go free, but we have 
never suggested that it allows the criminal to continue in the commis-
sion of an ongoing crime.”87 
The only societal benefit the Court addressed in its opinion was 
the need to protect the constitutional rights of both documented 
immigrants and citizens.88  Although a “legitimate and important 
concern,” said the Court, it quickly rejected the argument because 
those present lawfully would not benefit from suppression; after all, 
they cannot be placed in deportation proceedings.89  Thus, the only 
additional Fourth Amendment protection available to these individu-
als would be to deter INS agents from arresting them, which the 
Court had already discussed as being ineffectual due to the vast num-
ber of arrests made by each agent.90 
In assessing the factors that would decrease the deterrent effect of 
the use of the exclusionary rule, the Court noted three factors:  (1) 
the streamlined nature of immigration proceedings, (2) the INS’s in-
 
 82 See id. at 1046. 
 83 Id. at 1047–48. 
 84 In discussing the number of undocumented immigrants present, as well as the number 
arrested each year, the Court discussed “the staggering dimension of the problem that 
the INS confronts.”  Id. at 1049. 
85  Id. at 1046. 
 86 See id. at 1046.  Unlawful presence is a violation of the civil portion of the INA and is con-
sidered “continuing” as long as the individual does not have status.  INA § 212(a)(6)(A).  
As civil violation of the INA, it is the basis for institution of immigration proceedings.  
INA §§ 239–40. 
 87 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1047 (quoting People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926)). 
 88 See id. at 1045. 
 89 Id. at 1045–46. 
 90 See infra notes 99–101. 
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ternal control over Fourth Amendment violations, and (3) the lack of 
individual deterrent effect on any given agent within the INS because 
of the large numbers of arrests made by each agent.91  Regarding the 
streamlined nature of immigration proceedings, the Court stressed 
the need to maintain a simplified hearing process for determining 
whether an individual should be removed from the United States.92  
To support this idea, the Court cited to In re Sandoval, in which the 
BIA stated that immigration hearings typically involve “simple factual 
allegations and matters of proof.”93  As such, immigration judges 
would not likely be familiar with “the intricacies of Fourth Amend-
ment law.”94  The Court further stated that the fast-paced and simpli-
fied nature of the apprehension, hearing, and deportation of indi-
viduals should excuse enforcement agents from the need to “compile 
elaborate, contemporaneous, written reports detailing the circum-
stances of every arrest.”95 
Another important factor in the Court’s analysis was that INS had 
developed its own internal “comprehensive scheme for deterring 
Fourth Amendment violations . . . .”96  Included in this comprehen-
sive scheme were:  internal regulations, initial training, continuing 
education, and an internal process for investigation and punishment 
for violations.97  Because INS agents were the only individuals charged 
with enforcing civil immigration law, and each one was subject to this 
comprehensive scheme of training and investigation, adding the ex-
clusionary rule would not likely result in increased deterrence of un-
constitutional behavior.98 
The Court also noted that the number of arrests that result in 
hearings (versus individuals that voluntarily depart) did not support 
the notion that any individual agent would be affected in a significant 
enough manner to cause a change in behavior.99  Based on numbers 
provided by the agency in appellate briefs, each agent arrests about 
500 people per year.100  Of those arrested in any given year, about 
 
 91 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043–48. 
 92 Id. at 1048–49. 
 93 Id. (quoting In re Sandoval, 17 I&N 70, 80 (1979). 
 94 Id. at 1048. 
 95 Id. at 1049. 
 96 Id. at 1044.  The Court admitted that an internal scheme does not guarantee compliance 
with the Fourth Amendment but noted that “[d]eterrence must be measured at the mar-
gin.”  Id. at 1045. 
 97 Id. at 1045. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 1044. 
100 Id. (citation omitted). 
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97.5% agree to leave without a hearing in a procedure known as 
“voluntary departure.”101  Of the remaining 2.5%, few challenge their 
arrests and instead seek a form of relief from deportation in immigra-
tion court.102 
The data therefore reveals that even if 25% of those who pursue 
proceedings filed motions to suppress, then objections would occur 
in only three out of 500 arrests.103  In the past thirty years, fewer than 
fifty cases raised a Fourth Amendment challenge to the introduction 
of evidence at the BIA level, and only two of those applied to the ex-
clusionary rule.104 
Finally, the Court noted that even if a respondent were allowed to 
suppress evidence gathered during an arrest, a removal hearing 
would likely still proceed because of evidentiary rules, burdens of 
proof, and the inability to utilize other criminally related constitu-
tional doctrines.105  As Lopez-Mendoza’s case demonstrated, the 
“body” is not suppressible under criminal, let alone civil, court cas-
es.106  The Court reasoned that the presence of the respondent in 
court, coupled with both the low statutory burden on the government 
and the ability to draw an adverse inference from silence, would re-
sult in sufficient evidence to move forward in an immigration pro-
ceeding even if certain evidence was suppressed.107 
In what was to become the most litigated aspect of the case, the 
widespread violations and egregiousness exception, Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor included a single paragraph in Part V of the opinion, 
which only four of the five majority opinion Justices joined.108  In this 
single paragraph, Justice O’Connor left open a crack in immigration-
related litigation by stating that the holding of the Court dealt only 
with “peaceful arrests” and not “egregious violations of Fourth 
 
101 Id.  An individual can choose to leave the United States voluntarily without invoking their 
right to immigration proceedings.  INA § 240B(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a) (2006); 
C.F.R.  § 240.25. 
102 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.  at 1044. 
103 See id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 1043–44. 
106 Id. at 1039. 
107 Id. at 1043–44.  See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text, for a discussion on the bur-
den of proof and the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in immigration proceed-
ings. 
108 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050–51 (acknowledging that the majority’s “conclusion con-
cerning the exclusionary rule’s value might change, if there developed good reason to be-
lieve that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were widespread,” and noting 
that this case did not “deal [] with egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other 
liberties”). 
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Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fun-
damental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence 
obtained.”109  Furthermore, Justice O’Connor noted that the Court’s 
decision could be swayed “if there developed good reason to believe 
that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were wide-
spread.”110 
II.  REASSESSING SOCIAL COST AND DETERRENCE BENEFITS 
Both immigration and criminal suppression law have undergone 
substantial changes since the Lopez-Mendoza case.  In the nearly thirty 
years since the decision, the changes to both aspects of the law are 
too numerous to discuss in one article.111  This Part discusses how 
changes related to the process in immigration proceedings and the 
structure of enforcement have fundamentally altered three of the 
main factors the Court pointed to as decreasing the deterrence value 
of the exclusionary rule in Lopez-Mendoza.  Section A discusses how in-
tervening legislation has changed the nature of the judicial system 
through unification of the deportation proceeding and increased 
complexity in the law during both phases of the proceeding (deter-
mination of deportation and requests for relief).  Section B focuses 
on how the use of state and local law enforcement has watered down 
the comprehensive scheme the Court pointed to in assessing the 
INS’s ability to self-regulate violations.  And finally Section C address-
es how the introduction of these changes has drastically decreased 
the number of arrests each agent has, resulting in an increase of indi-
vidual deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. 
A.  Nature of Immigration Proceedings 
Out of the many changes to the immigration system since Lopez-
Mendoza, there are three pieces of legislation that have had the larg-
 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 1050. 
111 For example, there are over 100 pieces of legislation since 2000 that have amended the 
INA to some degree or another.  Some of these pieces were directed at specific groups of 
people, such as lawful permanent residence for members of the Armed Forces.  Act of 
Nov. 23, 2011, Pub. L. NO. 112–58, 125 Stat. 747.  Others saw more sweeping changes 
throughout the statute, with changes to various immigration definitions and benefits.  See, 
e.g., Child Status Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. NO. 107–208, 116 Stat. 927 (redefining 
whether an alien is a child for the purposes of classification as an “immediate relative”).  
This legislation contained mainly employer sanctions and discrimination issues, but also 
saw the first major “legalization” of unlawful presence.  Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–603, 100 Stat. 3359. 
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est impact:  the Immigration Act of 1990,112 and the 1996 dual legisla-
tion found in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act (“IIRIRA”),  the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).113  This Section first reviews how IIRIRA 
made significant changes to the process in deportation proceedings, 
then focuses on how all three of these pieces of legislation increased 
the complexity of the nature of immigration law. 
1.  From Exclusion and Deportation to Removal 
IIRIRA made a fundamental change to the deportation process as 
described in Part I of this Article.  Rather than two separate types of 
proceedings—exclusion and deportation—IIRIRA folded them to-
gether into one “removal proceeding.”114  By creating unified removal 
proceedings, Congress essentially eliminated any procedural distinc-
tion between those who entered with documentation and those who 
did not in order to streamline the deportation process.115  The unified 
removal proceeding follows many of the same procedures as the old 
form of deportation hearings (as opposed to exclusion proceed-
ings).116  Once an individual comes to the attention of Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), they are issued a Notice to Ap-
 
112 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. NO. 101–649, 104 Stat 4978. 
113 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. NO. 104–
208, 110 Stat. 3009–546.  IIRIRA was passed simultaneously with the Antiterrorism and Ef-
fect Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. NO. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214.  Jointly, these two 
statutes changed everything from criminal sanctions, to grounds for deportation, and the 
judicial system.  Although these changes are the most significant for purposes of this arti-
cle, it should be noted that extensive changes were made after 1984 and before IIRIRA.  
See Kati L. Griffith, Perfecting Public Immigration Legislation:  Private Immigration Bills and De-
portable Lawful Permanent Residents, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 273, 289–90 (2004) (discussing 
the state of immigration law prior to 1996). 
114 IIRIRA §§ 304, 308 (codified at INA §§ 239, 240C, and INA §§ 238–240, 240C).  In addi-
tion to the unified removal proceedings, IIRIRA created “expedited removal” which ap-
plies to anyone attempting to enter the country without documentation or using false 
documents, and to unlawful entrants within the border zone.  IIRIRA § 302 (codified at 
INA § 235).  Although this Article focuses on the internal procedure of removal proceed-
ings, it should be noted that expedited removal is the subject of scrutiny by scholars for 
lack of constitutional protections.  See Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye):  
Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475, 
520–29 (2013) (arguing that stipulated removal orders run afoul of due process). 
115 See Patricia Flynn & Judith Patterson, Five Years Later:  Fifth Circuit Case Law Developments 
Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 557, 
561 (2001) (“[T]o streamline the removal process, IIRIRA provided for limited judicial 
review [and] expedited removal proceedings (removal without a hearing before an im-
migration judge) . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
116 IIRIRA §§ 304, 308 (codified at INA § 239–40) (describing the procedures for removal 
proceedings). 
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pear (“NTA”).117  The NTA will provide factual allegations, including 
alienage, as well as charges of removability.118  The charges will fall in-
to one of two categories:  either deportability or inadmissibility.119  If 
an individual is charged with deportability, they have been admitted 
to the United States in some status (entered with a temporary or 
permanent visa) and their status is called into question.120  If an indi-
vidual is charged with inadmissibility, they did not enter the United 
States in any status and are undocumented.121 
In removal proceedings, the government has the initial burden to 
demonstrate deportability.122  For those aliens charged with remova-
bility, the government must demonstrate alienage and that the alien 
is deportable under immigration laws by “clear and convincing evi-
dence.”123  For those aliens charged with inadmissibility, the govern-
ment must only demonstrate alienage, and then the alien must show 
clearly and beyond a doubt that they are not inadmissible.124  If the 
individual is shown to be either inadmissible or deportable, they can 
then apply for any number of forms of relief from removal.125  It is, of 
course, the individual’s burden to demonstrate not only eligibility for 
 
117 IIRIRA § 304 (codified at INA § 239(a)(1)). 
118 Id. 
119 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012) (describing classes of inadmissible aliens); see also 8 U.S.C § 
1227 (2012) (describing classes of deportable aliens).  Although the procedure is unified 
into removal proceedings, the distinction between inadmissibility and deportability mir-
ror the old system’s distinction between exclusion proceedings and deportation proceed-
ings.  See Dana Leigh Marks and Denise Noonan Slavin, A View Through the Looking Glass:  
How Crimes Appear from the immigration court Perspective, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 91, 96 n.21 
(2011) (noting that, despite the unification of exclusion proceedings and deportation 
proceedings into removal proceedings, “in many ways the procedures remain substantial-
ly unchanged as there are still significant legal distinctions between those individuals who 
are seeking admission as opposed to those who have already entered the country, either 
legally or illegally”). 
120 Any violation of the terms of an individual’s stay can lead to this, including overstaying a 
temporary visa, or the commission of specific types of crimes.  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012).  
Nonimmigrants are typically given a specific period of time to remain in the United 
States.  8 U.S.C. § 1227 (b), (d) (2012).  Any violation of the grounds of deportability will 
lead to the institution of removal proceedings.  INA § 237(a)(2008) (codified as 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a) (2012)). 
121 The section of the INA that applies to these individuals is the section that applies to any 
individual seeking entrance, or admission, into the country.  INA § 212(a) (codified as 8 
U.S.C. § 1182 (2013).  The INA sets up a legal fiction that, although the individual is in 
the United States, they are not “legally” present.  Id. 
122 IIRIRA § 304 (codified at INA § 240(c)(3)). 
123 Id. 
124 This burden applies to both arriving aliens and aliens present without admission or pa-
role.  Id. § 304 (codified at INA § 240(c)(2)(A)–(B)). 
125 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–13, § 101(d), 119 Stat. 302, 304 (codified as 
amended at INA § 240(c)(4)). 
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the form of relief, but also that they merit a favorable exercise of dis-
cretion on the part of the immigration judge.126 
As with the prior deportation hearings, the current immigration 
court is set up as an adversarial bench hearing.127  There is an impar-
tial immigration judge, charged with upholding the immigration 
statutes.128  The two parties are the alien, or respondent, and the gov-
ernment, represented by the Litigation Unit of ICE.129  During the 
master calendar, the preliminary hearing, the respondent pleads to 
the charges listed in the NTA.130  The Respondent can either admit 
the allegations or concede the charges and state the form of relief 
they seek, or she can deny the allegations and charges, and request a 
contested removability hearing.131  Then an individual calendar hear-
ing is set to hear the merits132 of the case (either the form of the re-
lief, or accuracy of charges).133  Since the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in 
immigration court, the governing body of the agency has issued an 
immigration court Practice Manual, which serves to function in place 
of these rules.134  Individuals in court must abide by these rules, which 
pertain to court appearances, filing deadlines, forms of motion, and 
procedures for filing.135 
2.  Complexity 
Judges have often recognized the complexity of immigration law, 
pointing to both the intricacy of procedure, as well as challenges as-
 
126 Id. (codified as amended at INA §§ 240(c)(4)(B), 240(c)(4)(A)(ii). 
127 Proceedings to Determine Removability of Aliens in the United States, 8 C.F.R. 1240.1(c) 
(2015). 
128 Immigration judges are charged with many general judicial duties such as administering 
oaths, receiving evidence, and issuing subpoenas, but are also granted the right and duty 
to interrogate, examine, and cross-examine witnesses.  See IIRIRA § 304 (codified at INA § 
240(b)) (articulating immigration judges’ roles and responsibilites). 
129 See 8 C.F.R. 1240.2 (2007) (“Service counsel shall present on behalf of the govern-
ment . . . .”). 
130 8 C.F.R. 1240.10(a).  The NTA is divided into three main sections:  The first contains fac-
tual allegations that allege country of birth and citizenship, date of entry, manner of en-
try, and any facts related to the violation of status or undocumented entry; the second 
section charges either removability or inadmissibility, as discussed above; the third section 
contains information on service of the NTA.  IIRIRA § 304 (codified at § 239(a)(1)). 
131 8 C.F.R. 1240.10(c). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at § 1240.11. 
134 See immigration court Practice Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/ocij_page1.htm (last updated Oct. 2013) (providing guide-
lines for immigration court proceedings). 
135 Id. 
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sociated with statutory interpretation and knowledge of the regulato-
ry system.136  The complexity of the laws has, on occasion, led to mis-
understandings and even mistakes in court decisions.137  Although 
there are a significant number of factors that have altered the immi-
gration process since Lopez-Mendoza, changes in the substance of the 
law for the two-step process in immigration court (both the initial 
finding of inadmissibility/deportability and the potential forms of re-
lief) have made a major impact on the increasing complexity of the 
adjudication process.138  There are numerous ways in which the law 
has changed, but this Article will focus on three:  the increasing of 
the number and nature of the grounds of inadmissibility and remov-
ability, changes in both the forms of relief available and the legal 
analysis used to make eligibility determinations, and structural 
changes to the immigration court that increased federal litigation. 
The Immigration Act of 1990 was the first massive overhaul of the 
immigration system after the Lopez-Mendoza case.139  Among other 
changes, the Act expanded the definition of criminal grounds of de-
portability, including controlled substance violations and crimes of 
violence, while also foreclosing any form of discretionary relief from 
 
136 Circuit courts often express dismay at the labyrinthine laws that make up the immigration 
system.  See, e.g., Michele Kim, The Complexity of Immigration Law, IMMIGRATION DAILY, 
http://www.ilw.com/articles/2006,1215-kim.shtm (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) (providing a 
collection of quotations from the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits relating to 
this complexity).  For example, in a decision pre-dating Lopez-Mendoza, the Second Circuit 
noted that “[t]he Tax Laws and the Immigration and Nationality Acts are examples we 
have cited of Congress’s ingenuity in passing statutes certain to accelerate the aging pro-
cess of judges.”  Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977). 
137 David A. Isaacson, If Even the Chief Justice Can Misunderstand Immigration Law, THE 
INSIGHTFUL IMMIGRATION DAILY BLOG, CYRUS D. MEHTA & ASSOCIATES, PLLC (June 3, 
2011), http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2011/06/if-even-chief-justice-can-
misunderstand.html (describing the failure of the majority in Chamber of Commerce v. Whit-
ing, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) to understand that the INA allows for work authorization to 
individuals that have been ordered removed by an immigration judge). 
138 Many commentators and scholars have pushed for a massive reorganization of the immi-
gration system, pushing some aspect of the adjudicative process to traditional Article I, or 
Article III courts.  See Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 
DUKE L. J. 1635, 1640 (2010); National Association of immigration judges, Improving Effi-
ciency and Ensuring Justice in the immigration court System, Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
May 18, 2011; LENNI B. BENSON & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ENHANCING QUALITY AND 
TIMELINESS IN IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJUDICATION, REPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 117 (June 7, 2012). 
139 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. 101–649, 104 Stat. 4978.  Although the 1986 IRCA made 
significant changes to the employment aspect of immigration and contained a major le-
galization aspect, the Immigration Act of 1990 made more pervasive changes including 
creating and changing the basis for many temporary and permanent visas, along with cre-
ating additional grounds for relief from deportation.  Id. at. §§ 101–02, 111, 121, 301–03. 
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deportation.140  IIRIRA, coupled with the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act, again made a major change in the grounds of de-
portability, most notably by expanding the definition of “aggravated 
felony,” a ground that not only results in deportation, but also results 
in ineligibility for most forms of relief in immigration.141 
As the grounds for deportability have increased, so too has the 
complexity of the legal analyses surrounding the application of these 
grounds and eligibility for forms of relief.  The increasing grounds of 
criminal basis for removability have inexorably tied the immigration 
system to criminal case law.142  Although that relationship would seem 
to decrease complexity by allowing the immigration system to directly 
import legal analysis from the criminal system, it has on occasion re-
sulted in an increase in complexity when immigration adjudicators 
elect to alter the criminal analysis.143 
Despite this increasing complexity in immigration proceedings, 
the BIA was reduced in number and type of review.  The BIA, the ap-
pellate body located within the immigration system, had grown to 
twenty-three judges who were responsible for reviewing all appeals 
from immigration proceedings appeals.144  In 2002, the Attorney 
 
140 INA §§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and 212(a)(2)(C)(i) both contain provisions for inadmissibil-
ity based on the definition of controlled substances in 21 U.S.C. § 802.  One of the aggra-
vated felonies triggering deportability is a crime of violence defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16.  
INA § 101(a)(43)(F). 
141 See Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 111–14 (1998); cf. INA §§ 237(a)(2) and 101(a)(43) (defining aggra-
vated felony). 
142 The most obvious way this is found is within the INA itself.  Many of the aggravated felo-
nies are defined through the federal criminal code.  INA §§ 101(a)(43)(A),(U).  For in-
stance, one of the enumerated aggravated felonies is a crime of violence “as defined in 
section 16 of title 18.”  101(a)(43)(F).  Well over half of the enumerated aggravated felo-
nies contain such a reference.  INA §§ 101(a)(43)(B)–(F), (H)–(M), (P). 
143 A timely example of this is the battle surrounding the categorical analysis.  Although tra-
ditionally applied in the immigration context as laid out in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 
575 (1990), the Attorney General issued In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. 687, 700, 704 
(A.G. 2008), adding the ability for judges to consider “additional evidence” in certain cir-
cumstances.  Jennifer Koh offers a more in-depth discussion of this case, and the impact 
of the recent Supreme Court decisions on the analysis, along with a discussion of com-
plexity of deportability and forms of relief.  Koh, supra note 16, at 1830–36.  For an ex-
ample of how forms of relief have been complicated, the REAL ID Act offers a prime ex-
ample in the increased burden of proof, and credibility determination scheme laid out in 
INA § 208(b)(3) of the asylum statutes.  For further discussion of the complexity of the 
asylum standard, see Anna O. Law, The Ninth Circuit’s Internal Adjudicative Procedures and 
Their Effect on Pro Se and Asylum Appeals, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 647, 653–57 (2011). 
144 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2008); Board of Immigration Appeals:  Procedural Reforms to Improve 
Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 
1003 (2008)). 
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General introduced an initiative referred to as “streamlining.”145  This 
initiative resulted in a massive restructuring of the BIA, moving from 
twenty-three judges to eleven.146  Further, while the practice in the 
past had been to have a three-judge panel review most cases, this ini-
tiative provided for the majority of cases to be reviewed by a single 
member.147  Practitioners, scholars, and immigration judges criticized 
this new structure as creating a mere rubber stamp at this appellate 
level, resulting in record numbers of appeals in nearly every circuit 
around the country.148  Wait times in immigration courts have steadily 
been rising, despite a decrease in charging documents being issued 
by ICE.149 
B.  Internal Control 
Another major shift in the immigration process since Lopez-
Mendoza is how civil immigration law is enforced.150  When the Lopez-
Mendoza decision came out, law enforcement and immigration agen-
cies believed that although local law enforcement had the power to 
arrest based on federal criminal immigration law, federal officers ex-
 
145 Board of Immigration Appeals:  Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 
Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,881 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003 (2008)). 
146 Id.; see also Dory Mitros Durham, The Once and Future Judge:  The Rise and Fall (and 
Rise?) of Independence in U.S. Immigration Courts, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 682–83 
(2006). 
147 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a) (2008). 
148 For a comprehensive discussion of this phenomenon, including statistics related to in-
creases in appeals, increasing summary affirmances at the Board level, and decreasing 
grants of forms of relief, see ANNA O. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN 
COURTS 144–155 (2010); see also Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority:  Why Congress Should 
Establish an Article I immigration court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGRATION BULLETIN 3, 9 (2008); 
Margot K. Mendelson, Constructing America:  Mythmaking in U.S. Immigration Courts, 119 
YALE L.J. 1012, 1038 (2010); John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging 
Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court?   An Empirical Analysis of the Recent 
Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2005); Veena Reddy, Judicial Re-
view of Final Orders of Removal in the Wake of the Real ID Act, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 596 
(2008). 
149 The average wait time in showing a steading increase in at least the past five years from 
447 days in 2010 to 597 days in 2015.  Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRANSACTIONAL 
RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/ 
(last visited March 20, 2015).  In addition, new case openings have steadily decreased 
since 2010 from 247,000 per year to a projected 221,500 per year in 2015.  New Filings 
Seeking Removal Orders in immigration courts through February 2015, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS 
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/charges/apprep_
newfilings.php (last visited Mar. 20, 2015). 
150 As argued, infra, the creation of programs allowing state and local law enforcement is re-
sponsible for this change.  INA § 287(g) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357). 
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clusively enforced civil immigration law.151  Of course, the law did not 
prohibit INS officers from requesting aid from local law enforcement 
in an action, such as a raid, where the officers were “acting under the 
direction of INS officers.”152  However, despite these powers of arrest 
or work under the direct supervision of INS officers, local law en-
forcement were not explicitly provided with enforcement capability 
for civil immigration law and, more importantly, were still required to 
comply with the Fourth Amendment.153 
Shortly after the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986, the former INS began to formally create ties to local law 
enforcement agencies through the creation of the Institutional Re-
moval Program (“IRP”) and the Alien Criminal Apprehension Pro-
gram (“ACAP”).154  These programs were merged into a single pro-
gram—the Criminal Alien Program (“CAP”)—in 2007, and continue 
to operate within the federal, state, and local prison system to identify 
convicted foreign-born individuals.155  In addition to this program, 
 
151 The distinction between enforcement of the criminal and the civil provisions was broadly 
discussed in an Office of Legal Counsel memo which found that local law enforcement is 
preempted by a “pervasive regulatory scheme” as analyzed in Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 
F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983).  Memorandum from Douglas W. Kmiec, Assistant Attorney 
General, Office of Legal Counsel to Joseph R. Davis, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, Re: Handling of INS Warrants of Deportation in Relation to NCIC Wanted 
Person File at 5 (Apr. 11, 1989); see United States v. Cruz, 559 F.2d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 
1977) (although initially stopped for a traffic violation, arrest and conviction were made 
on federal criminal law); United States v. Contreras-Diaz, 575 F.2d 740, 745 (9th Cir. 
1978) (permitting detention by local law enforcement based on reasonable suspicion of 
violation of federal criminal law). 
152 Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 732 (9th Cir. 1983). 
153 See United States v. Perez-Castro, 606 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1979) (“The Government 
may not successfully assert that the illegal act was done by state or local officers and there-
fore the statements subsequently taken are admissible in a federal prosecution, without 
concern as to the method by which they were obtained.”). 
154 US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities Fact Sheet 3, Mar. 28, 2008 
(on file with author) [hereinafter S-Comm Fact Sheet].  IRP was a program that screened 
convicted aliens serving sentences and attempted to initiate removal proceedings prior to 
the end of their sentences.  Id.  Federal correctional facilities were required to report for-
eign born convicts, but the program relied on voluntary reporting from state and local 
facilities.  Immigration and Naturalization Service Institutional Removal Program Audit 
Report [hereinafter IRP Audit Report], Sept. 2002 (on file with author).  ACAP was a sim-
ilar program that was meant to cover institutions not covered by IRP.  S-Comm Fact Sheet 
at 3.  These programs were highly criticized as being inconsistent in enforcement and, as 
such, lacked wide-level effectiveness.  See Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of 
the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate, Criminal Aliens in the 
United States Report, 104–48, Apr. 7, 1995; IRP Audit Report.  These programs were 
merged into a single program—the Criminal Alien Program in 2007.  S-Comm Fact Sheet 
at 3. 
155 Criminal Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). 
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement156 created Secure Communi-
ties in 2008.157  Under this program, upon arrest and fingerprinting, 
local, state, and federal jurisdictions are required to submit the fin-
gerprints to a Department of Homeland Security database, where the 
agency can then determine if the individual is also subject to remov-
al.158  Although initially there was some controversy over whether the 
program was voluntary or mandatory on the part of local, state, and 
federal criminal jurisdictions, the program is now active in every ju-
risdiction in the United States.159 
Perhaps most transformative to the enforcement regime, however, 
was the creation of “287(g)” programs, authorized in IIRIRA.  So 
termed because they are described in section 287(g) of the INA, 
agreements under these programs provide for state and local en-
forcement entities to receive “delegated authority for immigration 
enforcement.”160  The program contains requirements for officer par-
ticipation,161 and provides for a four-week training program.162 
This explicit delegation of authority erased any question of 
whether local agencies could enforce civil immigration law.  To clari-
fy this shift in enforcement, the Department of Justice Office of Legal 
Counsel issued a memorandum finding that state and local law en-
forcement were not preempted from enforcing the civil aspects of 
immigration law.163  This memorandum modified the 1989 memo-
randum issued by the same department which had indicated these 
agencies were preempted from enforcing immigration law.164 
 
156 In 2002, the enforcement and benefits branches of the former Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service were folded into the new Department of Homeland Security.  Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135.  The new benefits branch was 
named the Citizenship and Immigration Service, while enforcement was divided into 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (for internal operations) and Customs and Bor-
der Protection (for border operations).  Id.  The immigration court system remained un-
der the Department of Justice. 
157 Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). 
158 Id. 
159 Secure Communities Activated Jurisdictions, US IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 
(Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with author). 
160 Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.ice.gov/287g/. 
161 Requirements include:  US citizenship, a federal background investigation, one year ex-
perience as a law enforcement officer, and no pending disciplinary actions. Id. 
162 The training program is held at the Federal Law Enforcement Training ICE Academy.  
Id. 
163 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to 
the Attorney General (Apr. 3, 2002) (regarding non-preemption of the authority of state 
and local law enforcement officials to arrest aliens for immigration violations). 
164 See Kmiec, supra note 151. 
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Despite the training programs for both 287(g) officers and local 
agents participating in the Secure Communities program, localities 
around the country have reported widespread racial profiling is-
sues.165  Sheriff Joe Arpaio in Arizona is an example often cited for 
this proposition.166  Initially under the auspices of a section 287(g) 
agreement, Sheriff Arpaio instituted practices such as targeting Lati-
no neighborhoods for raids and discriminating against Latinos at ve-
hicle checkpoints.167  Although Sheriff Arpaio is a fairly extreme ex-
ample, jurisdictions that participate in these programs nevertheless 
“have abnormally high rates of non-criminal deportations.”168 In addi-
 
165 Faces of Racial Profiling, RIGHTS WORKING GROUP 1 (Sept. 2010).  Despite being forced to 
comply with the program, officials in Massachusetts and New York, including the gover-
nors of those states, are opposed to Secure Communities, citing encouragement of racial 
profiling and eroded trust in law enforcement.  Julia Preston, Despite Opposition, Immigra-
tion Agency to Expand Fingerprint Program, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2012),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/12/us/ice-to-expand-secure-communities-program-
in-mass-and-ny.html?_r=0. 
166 See generally Memorandum from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights 
Division to William R. Jones, Jr., Counsel for Maricopa County Sheriffy’s Office, Re: Unit-
ed States’ Investigation of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, at 5–6 (Dec. 15, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf; Steven 
W. Bender, Gringo Alley, 454 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1925, 1935 (2012); Tom Gaynor, Joe Arpaio 
to Fight Racial Profiling Monitor Ruling, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 1, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/01/joe-arpaio-racial-profiling_n_
4195208.html.  When faced with the controversy, DHS initially required him to sign a 
“watered-down” version in 2009.  When this failed to curb his actions, DHS was eventually 
forced to withdraw the agreement altogether in 2011.  Jeremy Duda, Homeland Security Re-
vokes 287(g) Agreements in Arizona, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES (June 25, 2012), 
http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2012/06/25/homeland-security-revokes-287g-
immigration-check-agreements-in-arizona/. 
167 Memorandum from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division to 
William R. Jones, Jr., Counsel for Maricopa County Sheriffy’s Office, Re: United States’ 
Investigation of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, 6–9 (Dec. 15, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf.  Sheriff 
Arpaio’s actions eventually led to a finding of racial profiling by the DOJ Civil Division, a 
revocation of the 287(g) agreement by ICE, and class action lawsuit.  Id.; see also 
Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 902 (D. Ariz. 2013); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t 
of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Janet Napolitano on DOJ’s Findings of Dis-
criminatory Policing in Maricopa County (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/
news/2011/12/15/secretary-napolitano-dojs-findings-discriminatory-policing-maricopa-
county; Faces of Racial Profiling, RIGHTS WORKING GROUP 6, (Sept. 2010). 
168 NAT’L COMMUNITY ADVISORY REPORT, RESTORING COMMUNITY, 10 (2011).  The national 
average for noncriminal deportation is 29%.  Some jurisdictions are reporting rates as 
high as 50%. There is also a plethora of information about decreasing arrest rates for 
criminal charges and rising response times that immigration advocates allege have oc-
curred since the institution of 287(g) in some jurisdictions.  For instance, arrest rates 
plunged from a 10.5% rate in 2005 pre-287(g) to 2.5% in 2007 in Maricopa County.  An-
drea Nill, What Happens When Local Cops Become Immigration Agents?,  IMMIGRATION POLICY 
CENTER (Aug. 6, 2008), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/what-happens-
when-local-cops-become-immigration-agents. 
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tion, some of these jurisdictions report a high rate of arrest for minor 
crimes for racial minorities despite the fact that these programs are 
created to capture serious criminal offenders.169  The high rate of 
noncriminal deportations coupled with the increased numbers of ar-
rests for minor traffic violations in jurisdictions using 287(g) and Se-
cure Communities has led some commentators to surmise that these 
programs create an incentive for local police officers to profile mi-
norities outside of the criminal context.170 
In addition to potential racial profiling issues, other studies have 
found that ICE enforcement demonstrates a pattern and practice of 
Fourth Amendment violations.171  The increase in claims of Fourth 
Amendment violations has prompted a corresponding increase in 
scholarly commentary about the issue.172 
C.  Individual Deterrent Effect 
The last major issue that the Court noted in Lopez-Mendoza as a 
factor that reduced the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule in 
immigration proceedings was the effect of deterrence on individual 
immigration agents.173  The Immigration and Naturalization Service 
 
169 Faces of Racial Profiling, supra note 165 at 6–7. 
170 See id. at 6, 38–39; CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, Rights Groups Release Docu-
ments from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Agency FOIA Lawsuit 
(Aug. 10, 2010); Trevor Gardner II and Aarti Kohi, The C.A.P. Effect:  Racial Profiling in the 
ICE Criminal Alien Program, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE ON RACE, 
ETHNICITY, AND DIVERSITY 8 (Sept. 2009) (finding that the institution of the C.A.P. pro-
gram in Irvine, Texas, resulted in a substantial rise in traffic arrests and arrests for petty 
misdemeanor offenses); Under Siege:  Life for Low-Income Latinos in the South, SOUTHERN 
POVERTY LAW CENTER 2 (Apr. 2009) (describing various methods of racial profiling in-
cluding roadblocks in predominantly Latino areas but citing to lack of data and refusal to 
respond for requests for information by localities as a common cause of lack of substan-
tial evidence of racial profiling); Deborah M. Weissman, et al., The Policies and Politics of 
Local Immigration Enforcement Laws:  287(g) Program in North Carolina, AMERICAN CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION OF NORTH CAROLINA LEGAL FOUNDATION 29–29 (Feb. 2009) (discussing 
targeting minorities in traffic stops and the vast resources transferred to capture people 
under 287(g)); RESTORING COMMUNITY, supra note 168, at 7 (citing Chris Burbank, Chief 
of Police for Salt Lake City). 
171 Brief for Oliva-Ramos as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney 
General of the United States, 694 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2012) (No. 10–3849); Bess Chiu, et 
al., Constitution on ICE: A Report on Immigration Home Raid Operations, CARDOZO 
IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC 3 (2009). 
172 Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the 
Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 
WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1112 (2009); see also Brief for Maria Argueta as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Petitioner, Maria Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60 
(3d Cir. 2011) (No. 10–1479). 
173 See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1984). 
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did not regularly publish statistical information related to arrests, 
cases, and dispositions during the period prior to the 1984 Lopez-
Mendoza decision.174  However, from the information provided in both 
the Supreme Court’s opinion and the briefs by both parties, some in-
formation related to the percentage of arrests per individual agent 
can be extrapolated. 
In 1983, the estimated number of deportable aliens apprehended 
was 1,106,683.175  From that information, the Lopez-Mendoza Court de-
termined, given the rate of apprehension and number of INS agents, 
that each INS agent apprehended approximately 500 individuals per 
year.176  One would therefore estimate that approximately 2,213 
agents were active in the field during this time frame. 
Of the individuals arrested per year during the early 1980s, 97.5% 
agreed to voluntary departure, meaning that they chose not to exer-
cise their right to a hearing and voluntarily left the country.177  Ac-
cordingly, roughly 27,667 individuals sought either to contest the 
grounds of their deportation or seek relief before an immigration 
judge.  In contrast, only a negligible number of arrestees would even 
see a courtroom:  for each agent, only twelve out of the 500 arrested. 
Compare the 1983 statistics to those from 2012.  In 2012, the 
number of aliens apprehended by immigration enforcement was only 
643,474.178  Although it is unclear how many arrests each immigration 
enforcement agent made, the initial assessment below will use the 
number of individuals each agency employs.  There were approxi-
mately 21,000 Border Patrol agents,179 over 20,000 ICE employees,180 
 
174 The Department of Homeland Security now houses the archives for the then-INS.  Year-
book of Immigration Statistics, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).  The au-
thor found Statistical Yearbooks dating back to 1996, but no consistent source for prior 
years.  Since that time, however, INS, now DHS, has maintained detailed information in 
their annual Statistical Yearbook.  Id.  The adjudication branch of then-INS, now EOIR, 
maintains historical Statistical Yearbooks dating back to 2000.  Id.  Further, the statistical 
information cited in the Lopez-Mendoza opinion referred to information provided by the 
INS in appellate briefs rather than independent reports.  Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044. 
175 U.S. Gov’t of Accountability Office, Immigration: An Issue Analysis of an Emerging Prob-
lem (Sept. 1985). 
176 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044 (citing Lopez-Mendoza v. INS., 705 F.2d 1059, 1071 n.17); 
Petitioner’s Brief at 38. 
177 Id. 
178 Enforcement Actions, 2012 YEARBOOK IMMIGR. STAT. (DEP’T. HOMELAND SEC.) 91, available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/publication/yearbook-2012. 
179 Boots on the Ground or Eyes in the Sky:  How Best to Utilize the National Guard to 
Achieve Operational Control:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border and Maritime 
Security of the H. Comm. On Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 16 (2012) (prepared 
statement of R. Vitiello, Deputy Chief of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office, and 
Martin Vaughan, Exec. Dir. of Office of Air and Marine Southwest Border Operations). 
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and 1,500 officers trained and certified by under the 287(g) pro-
gram.181  In the same year, 410,753 cases were initiated in the immi-
gration court. 182  Of those, 317,930 moved forward to a full hear-
ing,183 while 26,635 immediately forwent proceedings and opted for 
voluntary departure. 184  Put in this way, the numbers demonstrate 
that arrests per agent have drastically decreased since 1983, and the 
number of voluntary departure cases has significantly decreased. 
 
Year 1984 2012185 
Apprehensions 1,106,683 643,474 
Agents   2,213 42,300 
Arrests per Agent 500 15 
Cases  27,667 410,753 
Voluntary Departures 1,079,016 259,356186 
Percent Voluntary Departure 97.5% 40% 
 
To be fair, it is clear that not every employee in ICE and CBP are 
active agents in the field; however, even if only 50% of employees are 
 
180 Occupations, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/careers/occupations (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). 
181 Fact Sheet:  Updated Facts on ICE’s 287(g) Program, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
(June 18, 2013), http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g-reform.htm. 
182 Executive Office for Immigration Review, FY 2012 Statistical Year Book B2 fig.1. (2013) 
[hereinafter EOIR 2012 Year Book]. 
183 EOIR 2012 YEAR BOOK B4 tbl.1A.  The remaining types of cases are divided into bonds 
(78,065) and motions (14,758).  Id. 
184 EOIR 2012 YEAR BOOK Q1 tbl.15.  It should be noted that these numbers are not com-
pletely compatible.  It would be impossible to determine what percentage of the cases ac-
tually received in 2012 resulted in voluntary departure because statistics on specific cases 
are not published in the Year Book.  However, the number of voluntary departure deci-
sions per year tends to hover around 26,000 for each of the past five years presented in 
the table. 
185 The Department of Homeland Security and Executive Office for Immigration Review 
provide annual Statistical Yearbooks.  Although EOIR has a 2013 update, the most recent 
data for DHS is in 2012.  In order to maintain consistency in numbers, all data was pulled 
from the 2012 yearbooks for both agencies.  In addition, statistical information provided 
by the agencies in recent years provide similar outcomes.  See generally EOIR STATISTICS 
YEARBOOKS, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/syb2000main.htm; DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-
immigration-statistics. 
186 Number was derived from adding the number of voluntary departure orders issued plus 
the difference between the number of individuals apprehended and the number of cases 
initiated. 
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responsible for arrests, the number of arrests per agent is still a dras-
tic decrease from that in 1983.187 
One could argue that the use of state and local enforcement of-
ficers actually decreases the deterrent effect in a traditional sense be-
cause they are not vested in the civil immigration proceedings.188  
However, 287(g) agents are agents of ICE for the purposes of en-
forcement; they have a memorandum of understanding, and there is 
some level of training through the federal programs.  To the extent 
that they are operating under both criminal and civil law, they cannot 
pick and choose which one they are at a given moment.  By acting as 
agents of both, the agents become vested in both the criminal and 
civil aspects of the arrest. 
III.  THE CONVERGENCE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
Fourth Amendment case law has also continued to evolve since 
Lopez-Mendoza.  The Supreme Court has increased the types of excep-
tions to search warrants in a shift towards concern for safety of both 
enforcement officers and the public.189  As the number of search war-
rant exceptions has grown, the Court has also reduced the impact of 
the exclusionary rule.190  In fact, some commentators have sounded 
the death knell for the exclusionary rule as an option to redress 
Fourth Amendment violations.191  Section A of this Part reviews the 
historical use of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings, 
and then discusses how each circuit has addressed the “widespread 
violations and egregiousness” language of the Lopez-Mendoza plurality.  
Section B gives a brief overview of the development of the exclusion-
ary rule in the criminal context. 
 
187 Even if only half of the employees are active agents, there would only be 30 arrests per 
agent.  Another interesting way to view the data is that even if only 287(g) program 
agents were involved in the apprehensions, the number of arrests per agent would still be 
below 500 (494). 
188 The Eighth Circuit tangentially addressed this issue in Lopez-Gabriel v. Holder, finding that 
the deterrent effect would be too attenuated, however that was not in the context of 
287(g).  653 F.3d 683, 686 (8th Cir. 2011).  The Court noted that there was no evidence 
that the state officer “acted solely on behalf of the United States.”  Id. 
189 Rather than a presumption of a constitutional violation, the Supreme Court has moved 
towards a balancing analysis.  Alec Rice, Note, Brave New Circuit:  Creeping Towards DNA 
Database Dystopia in U.S. v. Weikert, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 691, 699–709 (2009). 
190 Slobogin, supra note 25, at 343. 
191 Id. 
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A.  The State of the Exclusionary Rule in Immigration Court 
The lower court in Lopez-Mendoza noted that since 1899, there 
were only two cases in which suppression was applied; and that since 
1952, fewer than fifty immigration cases have included a suppression 
issue.192  But the history of the Fourth Amendment in immigration 
courts is more complex.193  In early cases, the BIA struggled to deter-
mine what role the law of unreasonable search and seizures should 
play in immigration proceedings.  At first, it relied on an early habeas 
corpus claim when finding that individuals were protected by the ex-
clusionary rule, though “possibly to a lesser extent than if this were a 
criminal prosecution.”194  Motions to suppress in the immigration 
context at that time often relied on one of two theories:  INS agents 
 
192 Lopez-Mendoza v. INS, 705 F.2d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 1983).  This claim must be taken in 
context.  In the immigration court system, the substance of a claim is not recorded in any 
fashion unless it is appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals.  Even once transcribed 
and sent to the BIA, there are no statistics related to how many of the cases appearing be-
fore the Board raised a suppression claim.  Within this structure, on average, only 1–2% 
of cases are ever appealed to the BIA, resulting in the substance of a case coming to light.  
Of those, only .1–.15% are actually published.  The result is that out of the nearly 250,000 
cases completed annually by the immigration court, only an average of thirty to forty lead 
to published cases, about .01–.02% of all immigration cases.  On average that means of 
the approximately 250,000 cases per year that the BIA hears, only thirty to forty cases will 
be published.  In 1984, only thirty-one cases were published within the BIA.   
193 Rebecca Chiao, Fourth Amendment Limits on Immigration Law Enforcement, 92–3 IMMIGR. 
BRIEFINGS 20 (Feb. 1992).  By the time of the 1984 Lopez-Mendoza decision, the Supreme 
Court had already begun to erode application of the Fourth Amendment in immigration-
related criminal cases.  United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 865 (5th Cir. 1987) (limit-
ing the application at the border and its equivalent); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (allowing for fixed check-points absent reasonable suspicion).  
Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has is-
sued several decisions impacting the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and 
immigration-related issues.  For instance, the Court noted that although the INA sets out 
standards for the ability to question and search aliens based on civil immigration issues, 
they are still tempered by the requirements in the Fourth Amendment.  Almeida-Sanchez 
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).  A large source of these cases surround the 
definition of the “border” and factors to take into account in determining reasonable 
suspicion of illegal entry.  United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–87 (1975). 
194 In re D-M-, 6 I&N Dec. 726, 730 (BIA 1955) (citing United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 
263 U.S. 149 (1923)).  It should be noted here that the Bilokumsky case was a landmark 
for civil immigration cases in several ways.  Not only did the case, at least provisionally, 
address the use of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings, the case also ad-
dressed several issues comparing the civil-based immigration proceeding to criminal cas-
es.  Bilokumsky, 263 U.S. at 153–57.  The Court first noted that there is no equivalent of 
the presumption of innocence (or presumption of citizenship) that there is in criminal 
cases.  Id. at 154.  Further, the Court noted that the there is nothing preventing a tribunal 
from drawing an adverse inference from an individual claiming the Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination.  Id.  Lastly the Court found that the rule excluding invol-
untary confessions had no application in the civil immigration proceedings.  Id. at 157. 
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either violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unlawful 
search and seizure, or they violated regulatory provisions of the 
INA.195 
Under the first theory, the BIA often applied a criminal law analy-
sis to determine whether an unreasonable search and seizure had oc-
curred.196  Although some of the cases followed the criminal analysis 
through to the end, many of them found application of the exclu-
sionary rule unnecessary because any unlawful activity did not affect 
the case’s ultimate disposition.197  In other instances, the BIA rested 
its decision not on an analysis of an unreasonable search and seizure, 
but rather on the regulatory scheme of the INA.198  As with claims un-
der the Fourth Amendment, motions to suppress under the regulato-
ry scheme were rarely granted, although for different reasons; in the-
se cases, the threshold for allowing a stop is so low that most 
warrantless law enforcement conduct easily passed muster.199 
Since the Lopez-Mendoza decision, lower court analysis of when and 
whether to apply the exclusionary rule has changed.  Largely to 
blame is the language in Part V of Justice O’Connor’s opinion, which 
suggested the propriety of exclusion in the context of “egregious vio-
lations of the Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might trans-
gress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative 
 
195 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, The Law of Arrest, 
Search, and Seizure for Immigration Officers, Manual No. M–69, at II–4 (1993) (explain-
ing the law regarding civil arrests). 
196 In In re Lennon, the BIA, somewhat belatedly given the number of cases that had already 
been heard on the merits, confirmed that motions to suppress can be heard in a quasi-
judicial hearings like the immigration court.  15 I&N Dec. 9, 12 (BIA 1974).  While many 
cases, such as In re Doo, addressed the substantive analysis of whether there was an unlaw-
ful search and seizure, the majority of the published cases tackled the more procedural 
question of the burden of proof.  13 I&N Dec. 30, 31–32 (BIA 1968).  In re Tang settled 
once and for all that the respondent must support a motion to suppress with proof that 
establishes a prima facie case before the burden shifts to the INS to justify the manner in 
which the evidence was obtained, explicitly borrowing the test from criminal law analysis.  
13 I&N Dec. 691, 692 (BIA 1971). 
197 For example, in In re Gonzalez, the respondent argued that he was illegally arrested, and 
thus the proceedings against him were unlawful.  16 I&N Dec. 44, 45 (BIA 1976).  How-
ever, respondent had already admitted to his identity, and his wife testified that the appli-
cation with the necessary information related to alienage and grounds of deportation was 
his, corroborating the government’s assertion of his deportability.  Id. at 46. 
198 In re Au is the first case to discuss the interaction between the two analyses.  13 I&N Dec. 
294, 299–300 (BIA 1969).  As noted in that case, often the two theories must often be 
viewed at the same time.  Id.  What may be found to be unlawful under the Fourth 
Amendment may pass muster under the INA § 287(a)(1), which allows a much broader 
range of activities with a lower burden on agents for searches and seizures. 
199 Id. at 300 (“A suspicion can be [a] reasonable one if no more appears than that the per-
son approached is in an area in which illegal aliens are found.”). 
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value of the evidence obtained . . . ”;  application of that specific lan-
guage has caused a circuit split.200 
Four circuits (the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits) have 
not taken up the issue directly, although they have recognized, to 
some degree, that the language of the plurality may have some force.  
Neither the Fourth nor Fifth Circuit has specifically addressed 
whether they recognize Justice O’Connor’s so-called “egregious ex-
ception.”  Moreover, neither circuit has explained what would actual-
ly constitute egregiousness; rather, both circuits confusingly have case 
law that omit the egregiousness language and case law that cite to it—
sometimes in the very same case.201  The Tenth Circuit lacks cases that 
discuss exclusion solely within the Fourth Amendment context but in 
one case it did mention the prohibition on the use of the rule in im-
migration proceedings.202 
The Seventh Circuit has flirted with the possibility of applying the 
egregiousness exception.  In most cases discussing the prohibition, 
the Court has cited to the Justice O’Connor’s exception, and notes 
that the court “left open the possibility” that the rule “may apply” if 
there are egregious violations.203  Indeed, in one case, the Seventh 
Circuit actually went through an analysis of whether the conduct in 
question actually rose to the level of egregiousness, but found that it 
involved mere minor physical abuse and aggressive questioning.204  In 
a recent criminal sentencing case, however, the court showed less in-
clination to use the exception when dismissing an argument for an 
 
200 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984.  Compare United States v. Sanders, 
743 F.3d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 2014) (dismissing the exception in the criminal sentencing 
context as a reserved question rather than a holding) with Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 
1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying the test to find a racially-based stop falls under the 
egregious constitutional violation exception). 
201 Initially, the Fourth Circuit indicated that it need not consider egregious violations; how-
ever, a later Fourth Circuit decision states that “Lopez-Mendoza establishes that the ex-
clusionary rule does not apply in civil deportation proceedings.”  United States v. Oscar-
Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2007).  But see Mineo v. INS, 19 F.3d 11, 1994 WL 
65051, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 1994) (assuming that the exclusionary rule applied where 
there were “egregious constitutional violations” that would render the evidence “funda-
mentally unfair.”).  See also Odukwe v. INS, 977 F.2d 573 (Table), 1992 WL 301941, at *1 
(4th Cir. Oct. 22, 1992).  The Fifth Circuit has noted the exception in several un-
published cases, but not in the one published case on the issue.  Santos v. Holder, 506 F. 
App’x 263, 264 (5th Cir. 2013); Escobar v. Holder, 398 F. App’x 50, 54 (5th Cir. 2010); 
Gonzalez-Reyes v. Holder, 313 F. App’x 690, 695 (5th Cir. 2009); Mendoza-Solis v. INS, 36 
F.3d 12, 14 (5th Cir. 1994). 
202 United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1115 n.9 (10th Cir. 2006). 
203 Gutierrez-Berdin v. Holder, 618 F.3d 647, 652 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added); see also 
Wroblewska v. Holder, 656 F.3d 473, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2011); Krasilych v. Holder, 583 F.3d 
962, 967 (7th Cir. 2009). 
204 Gutierrez-Berdin, 618 F.3d at 652. 
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exception in the sentencing context.  It therefore held that although 
the court “reserved decision” on the exception, it said only “we have 
explained why reserving a question does not equal a holding[.]”205 
Two circuits have adopted Justice O’Connor’s exception but have 
yet to apply it.  The Sixth Circuit, for example, follows the exception 
but has not applied it or defined what constitutes “egregious.”206  The 
First Circuit has similarly adopted the exception, but has not ex-
plained what “egregiousness” means.207 
Four circuits take a wider view of Justice O’Connor’s exception by 
both adopting and applying egregiousness.208  The Second Circuit, for 
instance, discussed the egregious exception in several cases that 
fleshed out the analysis, allowing for suppression in situations that 
amount to a Fourth Amendment violation in addition to a court-
defined aggravated factor.209  In doing so, the Court read the Lopez-
Mendoza plurality opinion to allow for exclusion where either (1) the 
violation created a fundamentally unfair situation, or (2) the viola-
tion undermined the reliability of the evidence.210  The court assesses 
 
205 United States v. Sanders, 743 F.3d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 2014). 
206 The Sixth Circuit explicitly recognized the exception in United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420 
F.3d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 2005) (The Supreme Court qualified its holding when it stated in 
the last paragraph of Lopez-Mendoza that “we do not deal here with egregious violations of 
the Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental 
fairness” (quoting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984)).  However, it was 
not necessary in that case to discuss what the meaning of “egregious” in this context 
means.  Id. (explaining that in Lopez-Mendoza the cases highlighted by the court were 
clearly egregious).  It should further be noted that despite this recognition, lower courts 
in the Sixth Circuit have still failed to apply the exception.  United States v. Wellons, No. 
05–80810, 2013 WL 357831 at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2013) (finding that the Sixth Cir-
cuit has not recognized the exception). 
207 The Court initially recognized the exception in Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19, 
22–23 (1st Cir. 2004) (recognizing the exclusionary rule).  Although the circuit has noted 
the exception in one other published case, it has not expounded upon the initial recog-
nition.  Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 70 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying the egregious 
exclusion). 
208 It is important to note that this line of cases maintains that, while the characterization of 
Part V is technically correct in that only four of the five majority Justices joined in that 
section, since the remaining four Justices dissented on the premise that the exclusionary 
rule should apply without restriction, a full eight Justices agreed with the premise that the 
exclusionary rule should apply in cases involving widespread violations or in egregious 
circumstances.  See Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney General, 694 F.3d 259, 271, 274–75 (3d Cir. 
2012) (explaining that all eight Justices thought that the exclusionary rule should apply 
in deportation proceedings involving egregious violations); Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 
771, 778 n.2 (8th Cir. 2010). 
209 Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006); Cotzojay v. Holder, 725 
F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2013); Pretzantzin v. Holder, 736 F.3d 641, 646 (2d Cir. 2013). 
210 Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006).  The court noted that alt-
hough the Supreme Court used the conjunctive “and” when discussing these violations, 
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both scenarios on a case-by-cases basis by considering four factors:  
intentionality of violation; whether the seizure was gross or unreason-
able; evidence of threats, coercion, physical abuse, or unreasonable 
shows of force; and whether the arrest or seizure was based on race or 
ethnicity.211 
The Third Circuit follows the Second Circuit’s analysis.212  Alt-
hough the Eighth Circuit initially adopted the Second Circuit’s test,213 
recent Eighth Circuit cases call into question whether it would apply 
the Second Circuit’s egregiousness test.214 
The most expansive view for the egregious exception is in the 
Ninth Circuit.215  In evaluating egregiousness, the court contemplates 
whether the “evidence [was] obtained by deliberate violations of the 
Fourth Amendment, or by conduct a reasonable officer should have 
known is in violation of the Constitution . . . .”216  This wide view as-
sesses whether a violation exists and, if so, moves on to considering 
whether there was a degree of culpability in the conduct of the of-
ficer.217 
 
because the Court cited to two separate lines of cases, it intended to use the disjunctive 
“or,” creating two separate areas in which the exclusionary rule can be applied.  Id. at 234. 
211 Cotzojay v. Holder, 725 F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir. 2013).  The Court noted that there are no 
hard and fast rules related to these factors:  On one hand the test is not so concrete as to 
require any of the factors (such as physical force); on the other, certain factors do not cre-
ate a per se presumption of a factor (a home invasion, for instance, would require addi-
tional factors to demonstrate fundamental unfairness).  Id at 182–83; Pretzantzin v. Hold-
er, 736 F.3d 641, 646 (2d Cir. 2013); Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney General, 694 F.3d 259, 278–
79 (3d Cir. 2012) 
212 Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 278. 
213 Puc-Ruiz, 629 F.3d at 778–79 (applying the egregiousness exception). 
214 Since its 2010 decision, the Court has consistently used language to distance itself from 
an express adoption of the egregious exception.  Lopez-Gabriel v. Holder 653 F.3d 683, 
686 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he application of the exclusionary rule to an immigration case 
involving such violations has not been resolved in this circuit.”); Lopez-Fernandez v. 
Holder, 735 F.3d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 2013) (“We need not decide today whether to join 
other circuits in holding that an egregious Fourth Amendment violation affirmatively 
compels exclusion in a removal proceeding because the Petitioners have not alleged an 
egregious violation”). 
215 Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1448–49 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that all bad 
faith actions require the exclusionary rule in civil cases). 
216 Id. at 1448. 
217 Although all cases in the two decades since Gonzalez-Rivera have recognized the exception, 
there has been some criticism of the line of reasoning.  See e.g. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Hold-
er, 560 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying rehearing en banc) (Bea, J., dissenting 
(with O’Scannlain, Tallman, Bybee, & Callahan, JJ.) (stating that the line of cases erred 
first in bifurcating the egregious exception, and second by focusing on the knowledge of 
officers rather than their conduct)). 
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B.  The Exclusionary Rule in Criminal Proceedings 
Since its creation, the exclusionary rule has garnered many critics 
who argue that the result of exclusion—freeing guilty defendants—is 
too great a consequence for a Fourth Amendment violation.  In addi-
tion, opponents argue that the main rationale for the rule, to deter 
officer malfeasance, is not a sufficient basis to justify its grave conse-
quences.218 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio to apply the 
exclusionary rule to the states, the rule increasingly became the sub-
ject of Supreme Court litigation.219  Through a series of cases in the 
1970s, the Court both steadily eroded the substance of the warrant 
requirement by creating several exceptions,220 and simultaneously be-
gan to limit application of the exclusionary rule.221 
Scholars and the judiciary alike have revisited use of the exclu-
sionary rule as a remedial measure in the decades since Mapp.222  
Scholars have, for example, noted that changing jurisprudence sur-
rounding the use of the exclusionary rule is now properly viewed in 
light of the purpose of the remedy.223  Early cases saw citation to high 
 
218 Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 
652–53 (2011); Richard E. Meyers II, Fourth Amendment Small Claims Court, 10 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 571, 574 (2013); L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It:  Moving Beyond the 
Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 671 (1998). 
219 Slobogin, supra note 25, at 346 (explaining a string of Supreme Court decisions). 
220 Among the most notable of these include the development of the Terry stop (allowing 
for a brief stop and frisk if conduct leads an officer to reasonably believe that criminal ac-
tivity may be afoot, that there is a weapon, and that the individual is presently danger-
ous), and approval of discretionless checkpoints, including those for checking immigra-
tion status.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1968); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543, 563 (1976).  Exceptions to the warrant requirement for both searches and sei-
zures are numerous.  United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983) (allowing for exi-
gent circumstances); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (holding that 
there is no requirement to demonstrate individual knew of right to withhold consent to 
search); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (creating the automobile ex-
ception). 
221 In fact, 1984, the same year as the Lopez-Mendoza case, saw three major cases limiting the 
exclusionary rule in the criminal realm including the good faith rule, inevitable discov-
ery, and the later-obtained warrant exception.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 
(1984) (adopting a good faith rule); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (adopting 
an inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule), Segura v. United States, 468 
U.S. 796, 810 (1984) (adopting a later-obtained warrant exception to the exclusionary 
rule). 
222 Keith A. Fabi, The Exclusionary Rule:  Not the “Expressed Juice of the Wolly-Headed 
Thistle,” 35 BUFF. L. REV. 937, 942 (1986). 
223 Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic Conception”:  The Importance of Judi-
cial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 50–52 (2010) (ex-
amining the history of the rule from the perspective of a remedy); Scott E. Sundby & Lu-
cy B. Ricca, The Majestic and the Mundane:  The Two Creation Stories of the Exclusionary Rule, 
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ideals related to “judicial integrity” in urging the importance of con-
sequences being attached to Fourth Amendment violations.224  Juris-
prudence, however, evolved to viewing the exclusionary rule as a “ju-
dicially created remedy”.225  In fact, Lopez-Mendoza and its forerunner, 
Janis, were both part of a larger change in analysis seen in the 
1980s.226  These cases, analyzing the application of the rule in non-
criminal cases, focus on a sterile analysis of the likelihood of deter-
rence and social costs, rather than the overarching principle of ensur-
ing “judicial integrity.”227 
Application of the exclusionary rule by the Supreme Court steadi-
ly decreased during the 1990s and early 2000s.  Then came Herring v. 
United States in 2009, which held that the exclusionary rule would not 
provide a sufficient level of deterrence for mistakes made by the po-
lice as a result of negligence.228  Although some view the holding nar-
rowly, scholars have opined that the subsequent case of Davis v. Unit-
ed States points to a more broad reading.229  In a review of past cases, 
the Court focused on the conduct of the officers in each case.230  The 
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majority opinion then summarized the exclusionary rule application 
as “serv[ing] to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent con-
duct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”231  
Thus, the Court broadened the social cost versus deterrence analysis 
by moving from focusing on whether there was an objective good 
faith error, to determining whether an officer was negligent.232 
Two years later, the Court had occasion to assess the exclusionary 
rule again in Davis v. United States.233  Unlike the officer in Herring, 
who relied on an erroneous police database, the officer in Davis was 
relying on circuit court precedent allowing for searches of vehicles 
after arrest.234  The Supreme Court later found such searches to be a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment when the arrestee is not within 
reaching distance of the vehicle,235 but the Court in Davis held that 
because the search was initially conducted in “objectively reasonable 
reliance” on appellate precedent, the exclusionary rule would not de-
ter future Fourth Amendment violations.236  In doing so, the Court 
reinforced the culpability standard set out in Herring, focusing not 
only on deterrence and societal costs, but wrapping the deterrence 
side of the test in a cloak of culpability and objective  reasonable-
ness.237 
CONCLUSION 
Given the significant changes in both immigration proceedings 
and enforcement since the decision in Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme 
Court’s concern about keeping immigration proceedings “simple” to 
enable swift adjudication in an administrative court no longer holds 
weight.  Immigration proceedings have become increasingly complex 
as a result of changes to the structure of the proceedings, as well as to 
the substance of grounds of deportation and forms of relief.238  Fur-
ther, the widespread use of state and local law enforcement for im-
migration purposes has altered both the number of agents enforcing 
immigration and decreased the amount of oversight for these agents. 
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In addition, because the development of exclusionary rule case 
law in the criminal and immigration context have, in application, 
been converging towards a similar theme of requiring a level of egre-
giousness, the Court should apply the exclusionary rule in immigra-
tion proceedings precisely as it is already constructed in criminal 
courts.  The decisions in Herring and Davis, which focused on the bal-
ancing of costs and deterrence, coupled with a focus on the culpabil-
ity of the enforcement agent, mirrors exactly the approach the Ninth 
Circuit has used in the immigration context.  A consistent approach 
to the exclusionary rule in both contexts would centralize the analysis 
and allow for consistent application in the immigration context. 
